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Abstract
We are interested in mechanisms that maximize social welfare. In
[1] this problem was studied for multi-unit auctions with unit demand
bidders and for the public project problem, and in each case social
welfare undominated mechanisms in the class of feasible and incentive
compatible mechanisms were identified.
One way to improve upon these optimality results is by allowing
the players to move sequentially. With this in mind, we study here
sequential versions of two feasible Groves mechanisms used for single
item auctions: the Vickrey auction and the Bailey-Cavallo mechanism.
Because of the absence of dominant strategies in this sequential
setting, we focus on a weaker concept of an optimal strategy. For
each mechanism we introduce natural optimal strategies and observe
that in each mechanism these strategies exhibit different behaviour.
However, we then show that among all optimal strategies, the one
we introduce for each mechanism maximizes the social welfare when
each player follows it. The resulting social welfare can be larger than
the one obtained in the simultaneous setting. Finally, we show that,
when interpreting both mechanisms as simultaneous ones, the vectors
of the proposed strategies form a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in
the class of optimal strategies.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Suppose that a group of agents would like to determine who among them
values a given object the most. A natural way to approach this problem is
by viewing it as a single unit auction. Such an auction is traditionally used
as a means of determining by a seller to which bidder and for which price the
object is to be sold. But the underlying mechanism can also be used in the
situation we are interested in, since in both cases the requirement of incentive
compatibility, that is, of preventing manipulations, remains the same. On
the other hand, the absence of a seller changes the perspective and leads to
different considerations. Instead of maximizing the revenue of the seller we
are then interested in maximizing the social welfare, that is in determining
the winner at a minimal cost.
This brings us to the problem of finding incentive compatible mechanisms
that are optimal in the sense that no other incentive compatible mechanism
generates a larger social welfare. Recently, in [1] this problem was studied for
two domains: multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders and the public
project problem of [5]. It was proved that for the first domain the optimal-in-
expectation linear (OEL) redistribution mechanisms, introduced in [6], are
optimal, while for the second one the pivotal mechanism is optimal.
1.2 Sequentiality
One way to improve upon these optimality results is by relaxing the assump-
tion of simultaneity and allowing the players to move sequentially. This set
up was studied in [2] for various versions of the public project problem and it
was shown that in the sequential pivotal mechanism natural strategies exist
that allow the players to increase the social welfare that would be generated
if they moved simultaneously. In this paper we consider such a modified set-
ting for the case of single unit auctions. We call it sequential bidding as
the concept of a ‘sequential auction’ usually refers to a sequence of auctions,
see, e.g. [7, chapter 15].
So we assume that there is a single object for sale and the players an-
nounce their bids sequentially. In contrast to the open cry auctions each
player announces his bid exactly once. Once all bids have been announced, a
mechanism is used to allocate the object to the highest bidder and determine
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his payments, to a bank and possibly to other players. Such a sequential set-
ting is very natural when we wish to determine which agent values a given
object the most: the agents then simply state in a random order their valu-
ations.
We study here sequential versions of two incentive compatible mechanisms
for single unit auctions, Vickrey auction and Bailey-Cavallo mechanism of [3]
and [4], the latter being a simplest and most natural mechanism in the class
of OEL mechanisms. In the former mechanism the payment consists of the
second highest bid and is sent to the bank, while in the latter the payments
are generated both to the bank and to other players.
1.3 Results
We first show that in the sequential Vickrey auction and sequential Bailey-
Cavallo mechanism no dominant strategies exist (except for the last player).
Therefore we settle on a weaker concept, that of an optimal strategy. An
optimal strategy for a player i yields for all type vectors a best response to
all joint strategies of the other players, under the assumption that the players
that follow i are myopic (i.e., their strategy does not depend on the types
of the previous players). For example truth telling is a myopic strategy.
These strategies exhibit different behaviour in these two mechanisms. In
sequential Vickrey auction optimal strategies yield the same payoff against
each vector of optimal strategies of the other players, which is not the case
in the sequential Bailey-Cavallo mechanism.
In both mechanisms we propose natural optimal strategies that differ
from truth-telling. While truth-telling strategy focuses only on player’s own
payoff, the proposed strategies are additionally ‘good’ for the society: in both
mechanisms they yield the maximal social welfare, when each player follows
it. In addition, the same outcome is realized under these optimal strategies
as under truth-telling.
In the sequential Vickrey auction this strategy is also socially maximal,
which means that it simultaneously guarantees the maximal utility to every
other player, under the assumption that they are truth-telling. In contrast, in
the sequential Bailey-Cavallo mechanism no socially maximal strategy exists,
except for the first and last player. (We actually establish a stronger negative
result.) The nature of the proposed strategies can be further clarified when
interpreting both mechanisms as simultaneous ones. We show that in both
cases their vectors form then a Pareto optimal Nash equilibrium in the class
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of optimal strategies.
The paper is organized as follows. We first recall Groves mechanisms, in
particular Vickrey auction and Bailey-Cavallo mechanism. We review in Sec-
tion 3 the concepts introduced in [2] concerned with a taxonomy of strategies
in sequential mechanisms. In Section 4 we establish some preparatory results
for sequential Groves mechanisms.
The main results are established in the next two sections, 5 and 6, in
which we deal with the sequential versions of Vickrey auction and Bailey-
Cavallo mechanism. In Section 7 we discuss the corresponding simultaneous
mechanisms, and in Section 8 discuss possible future research.
2 Preliminaries
We collect here the necessary background material. Readers familiar with
Groves mechanisms can safely move to Subsection 2.2.3.
2.1 Tax-based mechanisms
We first briefly review tax-based mechanisms (see, e.g., [8]). Assume that
there is a finite set of possible outcomes or decisions D, a set {1, . . ., n}
of players where n ≥ 2, and for each player i a set of types Θi and an
(initial ) utility function vi : D×Θi → R. A decision rule is a function
f : Θ→D, where Θ := Θ1 × · · · ×Θn.
In a tax-based mechanism , in short a mechanism , each player re-
ports a type θi and based on this, the mechanism selects an outcome and a
payment to be made by every agent. Hence a mechanism is given by a pair
of functions (f, t), where f is the decision rule and t = (t1, ..., tn) is the tax
function that determine the decision taken and the players’ payments given
the reported types θ1, . . ., θn, i.e., f : Θ→D, and t : Θ→ R
n.
We assume that the (final ) utility function for player i is a function
ui : D × R
n × Θi → R defined by ui(d, t1, . . ., tn, θi) := vi(d, θi) + ti. For
each vector θ of announced types, if ti(θ) ≥ 0, player i receives ti(θ), and if
ti(θ) < 0, he pays |ti(θ)|. Thus when the true type of player i is θi and his
announced type is θ′i, his final utility is
ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) = vi(f(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) + ti(θ
′
i, θ−i),
where θ−i are the types announced by the other players.
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We say that a mechanism (f, t) is
• efficient if for all θ ∈ Θ, f(θ) ∈ argmaxd∈D
∑n
i=1 vi(d, θi), i.e., the
taken decision maximizes the initial social welfare,
• feasible if for all θ,
∑n
i=1 ti(θ) ≤ 0, i.e., the mechanism does not need
to be funded by an external source,
• incentive compatible if for all θ, i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and θ′i,
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi).
2.2 Groves mechanisms
Each Groves mechanism is an efficient tax-based mechanism (f, t) such
that the following hold for all θ ∈ Θ1:
• ti : Θ→R is defined by ti(θ) := gi(θ) + hi(θ−i), where
• gi(θ) :=
∑
j 6=i vj(f(θ), θj),
• hi : Θ−i →R is an arbitrary function.
Intuitively, gi(θ) represents the initial social welfare from the decision
f(θ), when player i’s (initial) utility is not counted. Recall now the following
crucial result, see e.g., [8].
Groves Theorem Every Groves mechanism (f, t) is incentive compatible.
A special Groves mechanism, called the pivotal mechanism2, is ob-
tained using hi(θ−i) := −maxd∈D
∑
j 6=i vj(d, θj). In this case, the tax, t
p
i (θ),
is defined by
tpi (θ) :=
∑
j 6=i
vj(f(θ), θj)−max
d∈D
∑
j 6=i
vj(d, θj),
which shows that the pivotal mechanism is feasible.
1Here and below
∑
j 6=i is a shorthand for the summation over all j ∈ {1, . . ., n}, j 6= i
and similarly for maxj 6=i.
2This is sometimes referred to as the VCG mechanism.
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2.2.1 Groves mechanisms for single item auctions
Given a sequence a := (a1, . . ., aj) of reals we denote the least l such that
al = maxk∈{1,...,j} ak by argsmaxk∈{1,...,j}ak or simply by argsmax a. A single
item sealed bid auction , in short an auction , is modelled by choosing
• D = {1, . . . , n},
• each Θi to be the set R+ of non-negative reals; θi ∈ Θi is player i’s
valuation of the object,
• vi(d, θi) :=
{
θi if d = i
0 otherwise
• f(θ) := argsmax θ.
Here decision d ∈ D indicates which player is the winner, that is the
player to whom the object is sold. Hence the object is sold to the highest
bidder and in the case of a tie we allocate the object to the player with the
lowest index.3 By the choice of f each auction mechanism (f, t) is efficient.
Note that player’s i final utility in an auction mechanism (f, t) is
ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi) =
{
θi + ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) if argsmax θ
′ = i
ti(θ
′
i, θ−i) otherwise
where player’s i received type is θi, his announced type is θ
′
i, θ−i is the vector
of types announced by other players and θ′ = (θ′i, θ−i).
By a Groves auction we mean a Groves mechanism for an auction
setting. Below, given a sequence s of reals we denote by θ∗ its reordering in
descending order. Then θ∗k is the kth largest element in θ. For example, for
θ = (1, 5, 0, 3, 2) we have (θ−2)
∗
2 = 2 since θ−2 = (1, 0, 3, 2).
TheVickrey auction is the pivotal mechanism for a single item auction.
Hence it uses the following taxes:
tpi (θ) :=
{
−θ∗2 if argsmax θ = i
0 otherwise
That is, the winner pays the second highest bid.
3If we make a different assumption on breaking ties, some of our proofs need to be
adjusted, but similar results hold.
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2.2.2 The Bailey-Cavallo mechanism
The Bailey-Cavallo mechanism, in short BC auction , is the mechanism
originally proposed in [3] and [4] (in fact, Bailey’s mechanism is not always
the same as Cavallo’s mechanism, but it is in the setting in which we study
it). To define it note that each Groves mechanism is uniquely determined by
a redistribution function r := (r1, . . ., rn), where each ri : Θ−i →R is an
arbitrary function. Given a redistribution function r the tax for player i is
defined by ti(θ) := t
p
i (θ) + ri(θ−i), i.e., we can think of a Groves mechanism
as first running the pivotal mechanism and then redistributing the pivotal
taxes.
The BC auction is a Groves mechanism defined by using the following
redistribution function r := (r1, . . ., rn) (to ensure that it is well-defined we
need to assume that n ≥ 3):
ri(θ−i) :=
(θ−i)
∗
2
n
that is, by using ti(θ) := t
p
i (θ) + ri(θ−i).
The BC auction is feasible since for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and θ we have
(θ−i)
∗
2 ≤ θ
∗
2 and as a result
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) =
n∑
i=1
tpi (θ) +
n∑
i=1
ri(θ−i) =
n∑
i=1
−θ∗2 + (θ−i)
∗
2
n
≤ 0.
Furthermore, given the sequence θ of submitted types, note that if player
i is the first or the second highest bidder, then (θ−i)
∗
2 = θ
∗
3. For the rest of
the players, (θ−i)
∗
2 = θ
∗
2.
Hence
n∑
i=1
ri(θ−i) =
n∑
i=1
(θ−i)
∗
2
n
=
n− 2
n
θ∗2 +
2
n
θ∗3, (1)
and
n∑
i=1
ti(θ) =
2
n
(θ∗2 − θ
∗
3) (2)
so when the second highest type, θ∗2, is strictly positive and the third highest
type, θ∗2, is non-negative, the BC auction yields a strictly higher social welfare
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than the pivotal mechanism. Note also that the aggregate tax is 0 when the
second highest and the third highest bids are the same.
In some situations it is useful to employ Groves auctions that maximize
the final social welfare. This is for example the case when, as discussed in
the introduction, the players want to determine at a minimal cost, using
an incentive compatible mechanism, who among them values a given object
most. For such applications by the above observation Vickrey auction is not
an appropriate mechanism. In [1] it was proved that the BC auction is an
appropriate mechanism in the sense that no Groves auction
• always generates a larger or equal social welfare than BC,
• sometimes generates a strictly larger social welfare than BC.
This explains our interest in BC auctions.
2.2.3 A useful lemma
In what follows the following observation will be helpful.
Lemma 2.1 In each Groves auction for all θ ∈ Θ
(i) if θi > maxj 6=i θj and argsmax (θ
′
i, θ−i) 6= i, then θi + ti(θ) > ti(θ
′
i, θ−i),
(ii) if θ′i > maxj 6=i θj > θi, then ti(θ) > θi + ti(θ
′
i, θ−i).
Part (i) states that if player i is a clear winner, given θ−i (θi > maxj 6=i θj),
then it is strictly better for him to submit his true bid, θi, than a losing
bid θ′i. In turn, part (ii) states that if player i is a clear loser, given θ−i
(maxj 6=i θj > θi), then it is strictly better for him to submit his true bid, θi,
than a strictly winning bid θ′i.
Proof. Both properties clearly hold for Vickrey auction. In an arbitrary
Groves auction the tax for player i is defined by ti(θ) := t
p
i (θ) + ri(θ−i),
where tpi (θ) is his tax in Vickrey auction and (r1, . . ., rn) is a redistribution
function that depends only on θ−i. So both properties extend to an arbitrary
Groves auction. ✷
The above lemma will allow us to establish in Section 4 some general
results about sequential Groves auctions, which we will later apply to the
sequential Vickrey and sequential BC auctions.
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3 Sequential mechanisms
We are interested in sequential mechanisms, in particular sequential auction
mechanisms, in which the players announce their types sequentially. In this
section we review the relevant concepts, some of which were introduced in
[2].
As before, we assume a finite set of decisions D, a set {1, . . ., n} of players
where n ≥ 2, and for each player i a set of types Θi and utility function
vi : D×Θi → R. For notational simplicity, and without loss of generality, we
assume the order to be 1, . . ., n.
So each player i knows the types announced by players 1, . . ., i − 1, and
can use this information to decide which type to announce. To properly
describe this situation we need to specify what is a strategy in this setting.
A strategy of player i in a sequential mechanism is a function
si : Θ1 × . . .×Θi →Θi.
In this context truth-telling, as a strategy, is represented by the projection
function πi(·), defined by πi(θ1, . . ., , θi) := θi.
We assume that in the considered sequential mechanism each player uses
a strategy si(·) to select the type he will announce. Then if the vector of
types that the players receive is θ and the vector of strategies that they decide
to follow is s(·) := (s1(·), . . ., sn(·)), the vector of the announced types will be
denoted by [s(·), θ], where [s(·), θ] is defined inductively by [s(·), θ]1 := s1(θ1)
and [s(·), θ]i+1 := si+1([s(·), θ]1, . . ., [s(·), θ]i, θi+1).
In what follows we define several properties of strategies that are appro-
priate for our analysis of sequential mechanisms. To start with, we say that
strategy si(·) of player i is dominant in the sequential version of the mecha-
nism (f, t) if for all θ ∈ Θ, all strategies s′i(·) of player i and all vectors s−i(·)
of strategies of players j 6= i
ui((f, t)([(si(·), s−i(·)), θ]), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)([(s
′
i(·), s−i(·)), θ]), θi).
A weaker notion is that of a rational strategy. We define it by backward
induction. Hence starting with player n, we say that strategy sn(·) is ra-
tional in the sequential version of the mechanism (f, t) if for all θ ∈ Θ and
θ′n ∈ Θn
un((f, t)(sn(θ1, . . ., θn), θ−n), θn) ≥ un((f, t)(θ
′
n, θ−n), θn).
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Assume now that the notion of a rational strategy has been defined for
players n, n − 1, . . ., i + 1. If for any j ∈ {i+ 1, . . ., n} no rational strategy
exists for player j, then so is the case for player i.
Otherwise we say that strategy si(·) of player i is rational in the sequen-
tial version of the mechanism (f, t) if for all strategies s′i(·) of player i, all
sequences of rational strategies si+1(·), . . ., sn(·) for players i + 1, . . ., n, and
all θ ∈ Θ
ui((f, t)([s(·), θ], θi) ≥ ui((f, t)([s
′(·), θ], θi),
where
s(·) := (π1(·), . . ., πi−1(·), si(·), si+1(·), . . ., sn(·)),
s′(·) := (π1(·), . . ., πi−1(·), s
′
i(·), si+1(·), . . ., sn(·)).
(Each strategy πj(·) can be replaced here by an arbitrary strategy sj(·).) Note
that for player n the notions of dominant and rational strategies coincide.
However, for player i, where i < n it only holds that every dominant strategy
is rational, provided the set of rational strategies of player i+1 (and thus of
players i+ 1, . . ., n) is non-empty.
Another weaker notion is that of an optimal strategy. We say that strat-
egy si(·) of player i is optimal in the sequential version of the mechanism
(f, t) if for all θ ∈ Θ and all θ′i ∈ Θi
ui((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi) ≥ ui((f, t)(θ
′
i, θ−i), θi).
Here as before, θi is the type that player i has received and θ−i is the vector
of types announced by the other players.
Call a strategy of player j myopic if it does not depend on the types of
players 1, . . ., j−1. Then a strategy si(·) of player i is optimal if for all θ ∈ Θ
it yields a best response to all joint strategies of players j 6= i in which the
strategies of players i+1, . . ., n are myopic. In particular, an optimal strategy
is a best response to the truth-telling by players j 6= i. By choosing truth-
telling as the strategies of players j 6= i we see that each dominant strategy
is optimal. For player n the concepts of dominant and optimal strategies
coincide.
A particular case of sequential mechanisms are sequential Groves mecha-
nisms. The following lemma, see [2], provides us with a sufficient condition
for checking whether a strategy is optimal in such a mechanism.
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Lemma 3.1 Consider a Groves mechanism (f, t). Suppose that si(·) is a
strategy for player i such that for all θ ∈ Θ, f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θ).
Then si(·) is optimal in the sequential version of (f, t).
In particular, the strategy πi(·) is optimal in the sequential version of each
Groves mechanism.
There are two natural ways of maximizing players’ utilitities. The first
one calls for a simultaneous maximization of other players’ utilities. That is,
we say that strategy si(·) of player i is socially maximal in the sequential
version of the mechanism (f, t) if it is optimal and for all optimal strategies
s′i(·) of player i, all θ ∈ Θ and all j 6= i
uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) ≥
uj((f, t)(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj).
So a socially maximal strategy of player i simultaneously guarantees the
maximal utility to every other player, under the assumption that players
i+ 1, . . ., n use myopic strategies (so for instance, truth-telling strategies).
The second option is to maximize the social welfare. We say that strategy
si(·) of player i is socially optimal in the sequential version of the mecha-
nism (f, t) if it is optimal and for all optimal strategies s′i(·) of player i and
all θ ∈ Θ∑n
j=1 uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) ≥∑n
j=1 uj((f, t)(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj).
Hence a socially optimal strategy of player i yields the maximal social
welfare among all optimal strategies, under the assumption that players i+
1, . . ., n use myopic strategies. Note that each socially maximal strategy is
socially optimal. The converse, as shown in [2], does not hold.
Consider now a sequential version of a given mechanism (f, t) and assume
that each player i receives a type θi ∈ Θi and follows a strategy si(·). The
resulting social welfare is
SW (θ, s(·)) :=
n∑
j=1
uj((f, t)([s(·), θ]), θj).
We are interested in finding a sequence of optimal players’ strategies for
which the resulting social welfare is always maximal. In the subsequent
sections we shall see that such a sequence of strategies can be found for
two natural sequential auction mechanisms. However, in general, only the
following limited observation can be made.
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Lemma 3.2 Consider a mechanism (f, t) and let sn(·) be a socially optimal
strategy for player n. Then
SW (θ, (s′−n(·), sn(·))) ≥ SW (θ, s
′(·))
for all θ and all vectors s′(·) of optimal players’ strategies.
Proof. The proof follows by the definition of a socially optimal strategy. ✷
4 Sequential Groves auctions
In the remainder of the paper we study optimal player strategies in the
sequential Vickrey and BC auctions. We collect here auxiliary results that
hold for all Groves auctions, which we will use in the subsequent two sections.
We shall often rely on the following lemma concerning optimal strategies.
We stipulate here and elsewhere that for i = 1 we have maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj = −1
so that for i = 1 we have θi > maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj .
Lemma 4.1 Assume that si(·) is an optimal strategy for player i in a se-
quential Groves auction and that θ1, ..., θi−1 are the types announced by the
players preceding i.
(i) Suppose θi > maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj and i < n. Then si(θ1, . . ., θi) = θi.
(ii) Suppose θi > maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj and i = n. Then si(θ1, . . ., θi) > maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj.
(iii) Suppose θi ≤ maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj and i < n. Then si(θ1, . . ., θi) ≤ maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj.
(iv) Suppose θi < maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj and i = n. Then si(θ1, . . ., θi) ≤ maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj.
Proof.
(i) Suppose otherwise. If si(θ1, . . ., θi) < θi, then take ǫ > 0 such that
si(θ1, . . ., θi) + ǫ < θi and set
θi+1 := . . . := θn := si(θ1, . . ., θi) + ǫ.
Then θi > maxj 6=i θj > si(θ1, . . ., θi), so by Lemma 2.1(i)
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) = θi + ti(θ)
> ti(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = ui((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi).
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This contradicts the optimality of si(·).
If si(θ1, . . ., θi) > θi, then take ǫ > 0 such that θi + ǫ < si(θ1, . . ., θi) and
set
θi+1 := . . . := θn := θi + ǫ.
Then f(θ) 6= i, so ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) = ri(θ−i), where ti(θ) := t
p
i (θ)+ri(θ−i).
On the other hand f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = i and consequently
ui((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi) = θi − (θi + ǫ) + ri(θ−i) < ri(θ−i).
This again contradicts the optimality of si(·).
(ii) Suppose otherwise, that is sn(θ1, . . ., θn) ≤ maxj 6=n θj . Then
argsmax (sn(θ1, . . ., θn), θ−n) 6= n, so by Lemma 2.1(i)
un((f, t)(θn, θ−n), θn) = θn + tn(θ)
> tn(sn(θ1, . . ., θn), θ−n) = un((f, t)(sn(θ1, . . ., θn), θ−n), θn).
This contradicts the optimality of sn(·).
(iii) Suppose otherwise, i.e., si(θ1, . . ., θi) > maxj∈{1,. . .,i−1} θj . Then take
ǫ > 0 such that maxj∈{1,. . .,i−1} θj + ǫ < si(θ1, . . ., θi) and set
θi+1 := . . . := θn := max
j∈{1,. . .,i−1}
θj + ǫ.
Then si(θ1, . . ., θi) > maxj 6=i θj > θi, so by Lemma 2.1(ii)
ui((f, t)(θi, θ−i), θi) = θi
> θi + ti(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = ui((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θi).
This contradicts the optimality of si(·).
(iv) Suppose otherwise, that is sn(θ1, . . ., θn) > maxj 6=n θj . Then
argsmax (sn(θ1, . . ., θn), θ−n) = n, so by Lemma 2.1(ii)
un((f, t)(θn, θ−n), θn) = tn(θ) > θn + tn(sn(θ1, . . ., θn), θ−n) =
un((f, t)(sn(θ1, . . ., θn), θ−n), θn).
This contradicts the optimality of sn(·). ✷
This allows us to draw some helpful conclusions.
Corollary 4.2 In each sequential Groves auction for all θ ∈ Θ and all vec-
tors s(·) of optimal players’ strategies
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(i) for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n− 1}, maxj∈{1,...,i}[s(·), θ]j =
maxj∈{1,...,i} θj,
(ii) for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n− 1}, argsmaxj∈{1,...,i}[s(·), θ]j = argsmaxj∈{1,...,i}θj,
(iii) for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n − 1}, if θi > maxj∈{1,...,i−1}[s(·), θ]j, then θi >
maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj and also for any other vector of optimal players’ strate-
gies s′(·) we have θi > maxj∈{1,...,i−1}[s
′(·), θ]j,
(iv) either f([s(·), θ]) = f(θ) or if not, θn = maxi 6=n θi, [s(·), θ]n > θn and
f([s(·), θ]) = n.
Informally, items (i)−(iii) state that when each player follows an optimal
strategy, the first n− 1 of entries of θ and [s(·), θ] are very similar. In turn,
item (iv) states that, except when θn = maxi 6=n θi and player n submits a
larger bid, the same outcome is realized under an arbitrary vector of optimal
strategies as under truth-telling. This exception does not take place for the
specific optimal strategies we consider in the sequel.
Proof.
(i) and (ii) follow by a straightforward induction using Lemma 4.1. (iii) is
a direct consequence of (i). To prove (iv) note that if θn = maxi 6=n θi and
f([s(·), θ]) 6= f(θ), then by (ii) [s(·), θ]n > θn and hence f([s(·), θ]) = n.
Otherwise θn 6= maxj∈{1,...,n−1} θj and two cases arise.
Case 1 θn > maxj∈{1,...,n−1} θj .
Then by (i) we have θn > maxj∈{1,...,n−1}[s(θ), θ]j , so by Lemma 4.1(ii)
[s(·), θ]n > maxj∈{1,...,n−1}[s(·), θ]j. Hence by (i) and (ii) we get argsmax[s(·), θ] =
n and argsmax θ = n, that is f([s(·), θ]) = f(θ).
Case 2 θn < maxj∈{1,...,n−1} θj .
Then by (i) θn < maxj∈{1,...,n−1}[s(θ), θ]j, so by Lemma 4.1(iv) [s(·), θ]n ≤
maxj∈{1,...,n−1}[s(·), θ]j. Consequently argsmax[s(·), θ] = argsmaxj∈{1,...,n−1}[s(·), θ]j.
Also
argsmax θ = argsmaxj∈{1,...,n−1}θj . So by (ii) we get
argsmax [s(·), θ] = argsmax θ, that is f([s(·), θ]) = f(θ). ✷
5 Sequential Vickrey auctions
We now focus on sequential Vickrey auctions. We shall need the following
observation.
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Lemma 5.1 Consider a sequential Vickrey auction. For all θ ∈ Θ, all
vectors s(·) of optimal players’ strategies, if θn = maxi∈{1,...,n−1} θi, then
un((f, t)([s(·), θ], θn) = 0.
Proof. It suffices to consider the case when n = f([s(·), θ]). Then [s(·), θ]n >
maxj 6=n[s(·), θ]j, so by Corollary 4.2(i) [s(·), θ]
∗
2 = maxi 6=n θi = θn. Hence
un((f, t)([s(·), θ], θi) = 0. ✷
First, we establish the following negative result.
Theorem 5.2 Consider a sequential Vickrey auction.
(i) For i ∈ {1, . . ., n− 1} no dominant strategy exists for player i.
(ii) Every strategy sn(·) such that
sn(θ1, . . ., θn) > maxj 6=n θj if θn > maxj 6=n θj ,
sn(θ1, . . ., θn) ≤ maxj 6=n θj otherwise
is dominant (and hence rational) for player n.
(iii) For i ∈ {1, . . ., n− 1} no rational strategy exists for player i.
Proof.
(i) Suppose otherwise. Let si(·) be a dominant strategy of player i. In
particular si(·) is optimal. Choose now θ ∈ Θ such that θi = 2 and θj = 0
for j 6= i. By Lemma 4.1(i) si(θ1, . . ., θi) = θi. Take now truth-telling as
strategy for players j < i and the following strategy for players j > i:
sj(θ1, . . ., θj) :={
θj if θj > maxk∈{1,...,j−1} θk,
max{maxk∈{1,...,j−1} θk − 1, 0} otherwise.
Then ui((f, t)([(si(·), s−i(·)), θ]), θi) = 1, while strategy si(·) such that
si(θ1, . . ., θi) = 1 yields player i in this case the final utility 2.
(ii) It suffices to recall that for player n the concepts of dominant, rational
and optimal strategies coincide and apply Lemma 3.1.
(iii) It suffices to prove the claim for i = n − 1. Suppose by contradiction
that a rational strategy sn−1(·) of player n − 1 exists. By (ii) the truth-
telling strategy πn(·) is a rational strategy for player n. By the definition of
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a rational strategy, using s′n−1(·) = πn−1(·) and sn(·) = πn(·), we have for all
θ ∈ Θ
un−1((f, t)(sn−1(θ1, . . ., θn−1), θ−(n−1)), θn−1)
≥ un−1((f, t)(θ), θn−1).
By Lemma 3.1 πn−1(·) is an optimal strategy for player n− 1, so we have
for all θ ∈ Θ and all θ′i ∈ Θi
un−1((f, t)(θ), θn−1) ≥ un−1((f, t)(θ
′
n−1, θ−(n−1)), θn−1).
The above two inequalities imply that sn−1(·) is optimal. It suffices now
to take i = n − 1 and repeat the proof of (i) and note that strategy sn(·)
defined there is rational for player n. ✷
So we shall focus on the weaker notion of optimal strategy. The following
natural strategy for player i is an example of an optimal strategy that deviates
from truth-telling:
si(θ1, . . ., θi) :=
{
θi if θi > maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj ,
0 otherwise.
(3)
Note that strategy si(·) is indeed optimal, since it does not change the
decision that would be taken if player i is truthful, and hence Lemma 3.1
can be applied. When we limit our attention to optimal strategies we get the
following result.
Theorem 5.3 Consider a sequential Vickrey auction. For all θ ∈ Θ, all
vectors s(·) of optimal players’ strategies and all optimal strategies s′i(·) of
player i
ui((f, t)([s(·), θ], θi) = ui((f, t)([(s
′
i(·), s−i(·)), θ], θi).
This can be interpreted as a statement that each optimal strategy is
dominant within the universe of optimal strategies.
Proof.
Case 1 f(θ) = i.
If i < n, then by Lemma 4.1(i) and Corollary 4.2(i) we have [s(·), θ]i =
θi = [(s
′
i(·), s−i(·)), θ]i, so [s(·), θ] = [(s
′
i(·), s−i(·)), θ] and the desired equality
holds.
If i = n, then for j = 1, . . ., n − 1 we have [s(·), θ]j = [(s
′
n(·), s−n(·)), θ]j.
Hence [s(·), θ]∗2 = [(s
′
n(·), s−n(·)), θ]
∗
2. Additionally θn 6= maxi∈{1,...,n−1} θi
(otherwise f(θ) 6= n), so by Corollary 4.2(iv) f([s(·), θ]) = f([(s′i(·), s−i(·)), θ]) =
i and consequently
ui((f, t)([s(·), θ], θi) = θi − [s(·), θ]
∗
2
= θi − [(s
′
i(·), s−i(·)), θ]
∗
2 = ui((f, t)([(s
′
i(·), s−i(·)), θ], θi).
Case 2 f(θ) 6= i.
If both f([s(·), θ]) 6= i and f([(s′i(·), s−i(·)), θ]) 6= i, then both ui((f, t)([s(·), θ], θi) =
0 and ui((f, t)([(s
′
i(·), s−i(·)), θ], θi) = 0.
Otherwise, f([s(·), θ]) 6= f(θ) or f([(s′i(·), s−i(·)), θ]) 6= f(θ), so by Corol-
lary 4.2(iv) θn = maxi∈{1,...,n−1} θi.
If i < n, by symmetry, the only case to consider is when f([s(·), θ]) = i
and f([(s′i(·), s−i(·)), θ]) 6= i. Then f([s(·), θ]) 6= f(θ), so f([s(·), θ]) = n, so
this case cannot arise. If i = n, the desired equality holds by Lemma 5.1. ✷
This shows that from the point of view of each player all optimal strategies
are equivalent (assuming that each player has at his disposal only optimal
strategies). However, optimal strategies may differ when the players take
into account the utility of other players, in particular, the social welfare. In
[2] it was proved that in the well-known case of the public project problem
(see, e.g., [8, page 861]) socially maximal strategies do not exist. (It was
also showed there that socially optimal strategies do exist.) The following
result shows that in the case of the sequential Vickrey auctions the situation
changes and that strategy si(·) defined in (3) plays then a special role.
Theorem 5.4 In the sequential Vickrey auction strategy si(·) defined in (3)
is socially maximal for player i.
Proof. We noted already that by virtue of Lemma 3.1 strategy si(·) defined
by (3) is optimal. We also need to prove that for all optimal strategies s′i(·)
of player i, all θ ∈ Θ and all j 6= i
uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) ≥ uj((f, t)(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj). (4)
Fix θ ∈ Θ and j 6= i. Consider Corollary 4.2(iv) with sj(·) := πj(·) for
j 6= i. Then either
f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = f(θ)
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or θn = maxi 6=n θi.
Consider first the former case. If f(θ) 6= j, then
uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj)
= uj((f, t)(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) = 0.
Otherwise
uj((f, t)(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) = θj − (si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i)
∗
2
and
uj((f, t)(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) = θj − (s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i)
∗
2.
Since f(θ) 6= j, either contingency (i) or contingencies (iii) or (iv) of Lemma
4.1 apply. In the first case si(θ1, . . ., θi) = s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi) = θi, so (4) holds.
In the second case si(θ1, . . ., θi) = 0 and for all θ
′
i ≥ 0 we have −(0, θ−i)
∗
2 ≥
−(θ′i, θ−i)
∗
2, so (4) holds, as well.
In the latter case note that by Corollary 4.2(iv) we have f(si(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) =
f(θ) since [(si(·), (π−i(·))), θ]n = 0 ≤ θn. So f(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) 6= f(θ) and
[(s′i(·), (π−i(·))), θ]n > θn. Hence f(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i) = n and by Lemma 5.1
for all j ∈ {1, . . ., n} we have uj((f, t)(s
′
i(θ1, . . ., θi), θ−i), θj) = 0, so (4) holds.
✷
Finally, we show that when each player i follows strategy si(·) of Theorem
5.4, maximal social welfare is generated.
Theorem 5.5 In the sequential Vickrey auction for all θ ∈ Θ and vectors
s′(·) of optimal players’ strategies,
SW (θ, s(·)) ≥ SW (θ, s′(·))
where s(·) is the vector of strategies si(·) defined in (3).
Proof. Fix θ ∈ Θ. By Lemma 3.2 it suffices to prove that for all vectors
s′−n(·) of socially optimal strategies for players 1, . . ., n− 1
SW (θ, s(·)) ≥ SW (θ, (s′−n(·), sn(·))),
where s(·) is the vector of strategies si(·) of Theorem 5.4.
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Fix a vector s′−n(·) of socially optimal strategies for players 1, . . ., n−1. By
Corollary 4.2(iv) either for some j we have f([s(·), θ]) = f([(s′−n(·), sn(·)), θ]) =
j or θn = maxi∈{1,...,n−1} θi.
In the former case
SW (θ, s(·)) = uj((f, t)([s(·), θ]), θj) = θj − [s(·), θ]
∗
2
and
SW (θ, (s′−n(·), sn(·))) = uj((f, t)([(s
′
−n(·), sn(·)), θ]), θj)
= θj − [(s
′
−n(·), sn(·)), θ]
∗
2
.
Further, a straightforward proof by induction using Corollary 4.2(i) and
Lemma 4.1(i) and (iii) shows that for all i ∈ {1, . . ., n − 1}, [s(·), θ]i ≤
[(s′−n(·), sn(·)), θ]i. Hence [s(·), θ]
∗
2 ≤ [(s
′
−n(·), sn(·)), θ]
∗
2
, so
SW (θ, s(·)) ≥ SW (θ, (s′−n(·), sn(·))).
In the latter case f([s(·), θ]) = f(θ) so f([(s′−n(·), sn(·)), θ]) 6= f(θ) and
hence by Corollary 4.2(i) f([(s′−n(·), sn(·)), θ]) = n, so by Lemma 5.1
SW (θ, (s′−n(·), sn(·))) = un((f, t)([(s
′
−n(·), sn(·)), θ], θn) = 0,
so the desired inequality holds. ✷
This maximal final social welfare under s(·) equals
SW (θ, s(·)) = θi − max
i∈{1,...,i−1}
θi,
where i = argsmax θ. This is always greater than or equal to the final social
welfare achieved in a Vickrey auction when players bid truthfully, which is
θi −maxi 6=j θi. Additionally, for some inputs, for instance those of the form
θ∗, with the first three entries different, it is strictly greater.
6 Sequential BC auctions
Next, we consider sequential Bailey-Cavallo auctions. We first show that
in analogy to the sequential Vickrey auctions no dominant strategies exist
except for the last player. In fact we establish this for a wide class of Groves
auctions.
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Theorem 6.1 Consider a sequential Groves auction such that the redistri-
bution function r satisfies: 0 ≤ ri(θ−i) < (θ−i)
∗
1 for all i.
(i) For i ∈ {1, . . ., n− 1} no dominant strategy exists for player i.
(ii) Every strategy sn(·) such that
sn(θ1, . . ., θn) > maxj 6=n θj if θn > maxj 6=n θj ,
sn(θ1, . . ., θn) ≤ maxj 6=n θj otherwise
is dominant for player n.
(iii) For i ∈ {1, . . ., n− 1} no rational strategy exists for player i.
The proof is based on the same arguments as the proof of Theorem 5.2. and
is omitted.
We shall thus focus, as in the case of sequential Vickrey auctions, on the
weaker notion of optimal strategy. We have various natural optimal strategies
that deviate from truth-telling, such as the following one:
si(θ1, . . . , θi) :=


θi if θi > maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj
(θ1, . . . , θi−1)
∗
1 if θi ≤ maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj
and i ≤ n− 1
(θ1, . . . , θi−1)
∗
2 otherwise
(5)
According to strategy si(·) if player i cannot be a winner when bidding
truthfully (θi ≤ maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj) he submits a bid that equals the highest
current bid if i < n or the second highest current bid if i = n. Note that
strategy si(·) is indeed optimal in the sequential BC auction, since it does not
change the decision that would be taken if player i is truthful, so Lemma 3.1
can be applied. We will see later that strategy si(·) has some desirable
properties regarding the welfare of the players under the BC auction.
We now show that the analogue of Theorem 5.3 does not hold for the
sequential BC auctions. In particular this means that optimal strategies are
not dominant within the universe of optimal strategies in the sequential BC
auction.
Theorem 6.2 Consider a sequential BC auction. There exists a type vector
θ ∈ Θ, a vector of optimal strategies s(·) and an optimal strategy s′i(·) for
some player i, such that:
ui((f, t)([(s
′
i(·), s−i(·)), θ], θi) > ui((f, t)([s(·), θ], θi).
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Proof. Consider the following two strategies:
si(θ1, . . . , θi) :=
{
θi if θi > maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj ,
max{0, θi−1 − ǫ} otherwise
where ǫ > 0, and
s′i(θ1, . . . , θi) :=
{
θi if θi > maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj ,
θi−1 otherwise
By Lemma 3.1 both si(·) and s
′
i(·) are optimal strategies since they do not
alter the outcome that would be realized if players are thruthful. Consider
now an instance where n = 3 and the type vector is θ = (10, 9, 8). Under the
joint strategy s(·) the submitted types are (10, 10−ǫ, 10−2ǫ) and the second
player receives a redistribution of 10−2ǫ
3
. However, if second player switches
to s′i(·), the submitted types will be (10, 10, 10− ǫ). Hence the redistribution
to the second player is now 10−ǫ
3
. ✷
We now turn to the question of existence of socially optimal strategies,
which we answer negatively. This is again in contrast to the sequential Vick-
rey auction for which we established in Theorem 5.4 the existence of even
socially maximal strategies.
Theorem 6.3 The sequential BC auction does not admit socially optimal
strategies except for the first and last player.
Proof.
Take i ∈ {2, . . ., n − 1}. Suppose that the announced types θ1, . . ., θi−1
are distinct and θi is the second highest bid within {θ1, . . . , θi}. Suppose si(·)
is an optimal strategy for i. We show that it cannot be socially optimal in
the BC auction. To see this, note first that θi < maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj . Hence by
Lemma 4.1(iii) si(θ1, . . . , θi) ≤ maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj . We distinguish two cases.
Case 1 si(θ1, . . . , θi) = θi.
Then consider the following completion of the type vector: θi+1 is strictly
in between θi and maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj and all the remaining types are less than
θi. In this case the second and third highest bids are θi+1 and θi respectively
and the total sum of taxes is 2
n
(θi+1 − θi) 6= 0. However, if player i had
submitted θ′i := θi+1, which is an optimal strategy, the sum of taxes would
have been 0.
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Case 2 si(θ1, . . . , θi) 6= θi.
Then si(θ1, . . . , θi) ≤ maxj∈{1,...,i−1} θj , by Lemma 4.1. Consider now the
following completion of the type vector: θi+1 = θi and all the remaining types
are lower than θi. In this case, under si(·), the second and third highest bids
would not coincide and hence the sum of taxes would not be equal to 0. On
the other hand, for θ′i := θi, the sum of the taxes would be 0.
Hence we can always find a completion of the type vector and an optimal
strategy s′i for player i such that the sum of utilities is higher under s
′
i than
under si. ✷
The results established so far show that the sequential Vickrey auctions
and BC auctions differ in many ways. We conclude by showing that they
do share one property. Namely, within the universe of optimal strategies
there exists an optimal strategy si(·) such that if all players follow it, then
maximal social welfare is generated for all θ ∈ Θ. The desired strategy is
the one introduced in (5). This is in analogy to Theorem 5.5. However, the
optimal strategy used in Theorem 5.5 is tailored to the sequential Vickrey
auction and is quite different from the strategy employed here.
Theorem 6.4 In the sequential BC auction for all θ ∈ Θ and all vectors
s′(·) of optimal players’ strategies,
SW (θ, s(·)) ≥ SW (θ, s′(·))
where s(·) is the vector of strategies si(·) defined in (5).
Proof. Consider a type vector θ = (θ1, . . ., θn) and let s
′(·) be an arbitrary
vector of optimal strategies. By Corollary 4.2(iv) the initial social welfare,
i.e., the (initial) utility of the winner, is the same under s(·) and s′(·). Hence
we only need to compare the aggregate tax paid by the players.
We now proceed in three steps. First suppose that θ is such that θn ≤
maxj∈{1,...,n−1}[s(·), θ]j. By the definition of s(·) in (5) and the definition of
the BC auction (see (2)), we know that player n submits the currently second
highest bid under s(·) and as a result the taxes are 0. Hence for such type
vectors maximal social welfare is generated when players follow s(·).
Thus we may assume that θn > maxj∈{1,...,n−1}[s(·), θ]j. Suppose now
that θn−1 ≤ maxj∈{1,...,n−2}[s(·), θ]j. Then player n− 1 submits the currently
highest bid and since player n has the highest bid, the taxes sum up to 0 by
(2).
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Hence the remaining case is when θn > θn−1 >
maxj∈{1,...,n−2}[s(·), θ]j. In this case we know that when the players follow
s(·), player n is the winner and player n−1 submits θn−1. We claim that the
same happens under any other optimal strategy.
Lemma 4.1 and Corollary 4.2(iii) imply that when players follow s′(·),
player n is the winner and player n − 1 submits θn−1. Thus the aggregate
tax under s(·) is: ∑
i
ti(θ) =
2
n
(θn−1 − [s(·), θ]
∗
3)
and under s′(·): ∑
i
ti(θ) =
2
n
(θn−1 − [s
′(·), θ]
∗
3).
It suffices now to compare the third highest bid in s(·) and s′(·). For this
we need the following more general claim.
Claim 1 Let θ ∈ Θ, z = ([s(·), θ]1, . . . , [s(·), θ]n−1) and z
′ = ([s′(·), θ]1, . . .,
[s′(·), θ]n−1). Then for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n− 1}, zi ≥ z
′
i.
This claim also helps in understanding the intuition behind strategy si(·).
In particular, under the joint strategy s(·), any bidder, except the last one,
whose type is no more than the currently highest bid, is bidding the maximal
possible value among the set of his optimal strategies.
Proof. The proof is by induction using Lemma 4.1. If i = 1, then by
Lemma 4.1, z1 = z
′
1 = θ1. For the induction step, suppose the Lemma
holds for all i < k, where k ≥ 2. We argue about zk and z
′
k. By the induc-
tion hypothesis maxj∈{1,...,k−1} zj ≥ maxj∈{1,...,k−1} z
′
j .
Case 1 θk > maxj∈{1,...,k−1} zj ≥ maxj∈{1,...,k−1} z
′
j . Then by Lemma 4.1
zk = z
′
k = θk.
Case 2 maxj∈{1,...,k−1} zj ≥ maxj∈{1,...,k−1} z
′
j ≥ θk. Then Lemma 4.1 implies
zk = maxj∈{1,...,k−1} zj . On the other hand:
z′k ≤ max
j∈{1,...,k−1}
z′j ≤ max
j∈{1,...,k−1}
zj = zk.
Case 3maxj∈{1,...,k−1} zj ≥ θk > maxj∈{1,...,k−1} z
′
j . Then zk = maxj∈{1,...,k−1} zj
and z′k = θk. ✷
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The above claim does not hold if we also take the last player into account.
The reason is that when the last player’s type equals the currently highest
bid, then he is indifferent between winning the item or not and the set of his
optimal strategies is the whole type space Θ.
To complete the proof now, note that the above claim implies that the
second highest bid among the first n − 1 bids is at least as big in s(·) as
in s′(·). But since we are in the case that θn > maxj∈{1,...,n−1}[s(·), θ]j, this
means that [s(·), θ]∗3 ≥ [s
′(·), θ]∗3. ✷
This maximal final social welfare under s(·) equals
SW (θ, s(·)) = θi −
2
n
([s(·), θ]∗2 − [s(·), θ]
∗
3)
where i = argsmax θ. This is always greater than or equal to the final
social welfare achieved in a BC auction when players bid truthfully, which is
θi − 2/n(θ
∗
2 − θ
∗
3). Additionally, for some inputs, for example when the last
player is not the winner, it is strictly greater. It is also strictly greater when
the last player is the winner but the last but one player does not have the
highest type among the first n− 1 players.
7 Comments on a Nash implementation
In this paper we studied sequential mechanisms. Alternatively, we could view
them as simultaneous ones in which each player i receives a type θi ∈ Θi and
subsequently submits a function ri : Θ1 × . . .×Θi−1 →Θi instead of a type
θ′i ∈ Θi. The submissions are simultaneous. So the behaviour of player i can
be described by a strategy si : Θ1 × . . . × Θi →Θi which when applied to
the received type θi yields the function si(·, θi) : Θ1 × . . . × Θi−1 →Θi that
player i submits. Define then
s(·) i s
′(·) iff for all θ ∈ Θ, vi(f([s(·), θ]), θi) ≥ vi(f([s
′(·), θ]), θi)).
We now say that a joint strategy s(·) is a Nash equilibrium if for all
i ∈ {1, . . ., n} and all strategies s′i(·) of player i we have
(si(·), s−i(·)) i (s
′
i(·), s−i(·)).
By Groves theorem for all sequential Groves auctions the vector of truth-
telling strategies πi(·) is a Nash equilibrium. In contrast, the vector of strate-
gies si(·) defined in (3) is not a Nash equilibrium in a sequential Vickrey
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auction. Indeed, take two players and θ = (1, 2). Then for player 1 it is
advantageous to deviate from s1(·) strategy and submit 3. This way player
2 submits 0 and player’s 1 final utility becomes 1 instead of 0. The same
remark holds for sequential BC auctions.
On the other hand, if we only admit optimal strategies, then Theorems
5.3 and 5.5 state that in the case of sequential Vickrey auctions the vector of
strategies si(·) defined in (3) is a dominant strategy Nash equilibrium that is
also Pareto optimal. An analogous result holds for sequential BC auctions,
though the qualification ‘dominant’ needs to be dropped. We omit the proof.
8 Final remarks
This paper and our previous recent work, [2], forms part of a larger research
endevour in which we seek in sequential versions of commonly used incentive
compatible mechanisms optimal strategies that, when followed by all players,
yield a maximal social welfare. We studied sequential versions of two mecha-
nisms in the single unit auction setting: Vickrey auction and Bailey-Cavallo
mechanism. We showed that in each of them natural optimal strategies ex-
ist with the property that when each player follows them, a maximal social
welfare results.
One could carry out a similar analysis for other Groves auctions with
relatively simple redistribution functions. However, we are not aware of
a uniform approach to identify in Groves auctions optimal strategies that
maximize social welfare. We believe that these results can be extended to
multi-unit auctions with unit demand bidders. A natural question is whether
similar results can be established for other types of auctions, for example
auctions with single-minded bidders or more general combinatorial auctions.
The maximal social welfare is attained here in the sense that any vec-
tor of different optimal strategies yields a smaller social welfare. This is
in contrast to the customary, simultaneous setting, in which weaker results
were established in [1], namely that specific incentive compatible mechanisms
are undominated. Various related questions remain open. For example, in
the case of the public project problem with unequal participation costs it is
not known whether undominated feasible (simultaneous) Groves mechanisms
exist.
We would like to undertake similar study of the incentive compatible
mechanism proposed in [9], and of its sequential version. This mechanism
25
deals with the problem of purchasing a shortest path in a network and is, in
contrast to the mechanisms here considered, not feasible.
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